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Workmen's Compensation
L. BARRY KEYFETZ* AND
TAMARA L. DWORSKY**
In this article the authors discuss recent legislative and judi-
cial developments in workmen's compensation law. They note
that the Act will be completely reviewed in July 1979 but discuss
the topics of payment of attorney's fees, coverage, changes in
compensation benefits, offset provisions and changes in the rules
of procedure.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, workmen's compensation has been the focus of
considerable attention in the political arena. The source of this
attention is the cost of the program which has resulted both in
legislative changes, effective July 1, 1978, and in the significant
* Partner in the firm of Keyfetz & Poses, Miami, Florida; J.D., Harvard Law School;
admitted to practice in Florida, New York and Massachusetts; Chairman, Section on Work-
men's Compensation, Florida Bar Association; Associate Editor, Academy of Florida Trial
Lawyers Journal.
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possibility of a sweeping revision in the next legislative session.'
Although this "sunset" provision portends the possibility of sub-
stantial changes, there will undoubtedly be many areas left un-
changed. In addition, as is common when an act is supplanted by a
revision, the judiciary will continue to look to existing case law for
guidance. This, however, is further qualified because the judicial
decisionmaking process reflects influences from the political sphere.
Recent legislative changes and judicial decisions have narrowed the
scope of the Workmen's Compensation Act. It is anticipated that
forthcoming legislative and judicial changes will continue this
trend.
With an awareness of the above limitations which prevent a
definitive di.iciiion of the status of the workmen's compensation
law, the authors will first report the recent legislative changes and
then review the significant judicial decisions in the area.
I. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
A. Coverage
Coverage of workers has been limited by the legislature's return
to pre-July 1, 1974 status requiring an employer to have workmen's
compensation coverage only where he has three or more employees.
Volunteers serving private, nonprofit agencies and participating in
specifically defined federal programs are likewise excluded.'
B. Benefits
Benefits for those individuals having lesser bodily injuries have
been reduced to one-half of the previous benefits, while weekly ben-
efits for the very seriously disabled have been increased. Bodily
benefits for an employee who suffers less than permanent total disa-
bility had always been calculated by applying the percentage of
disability to a schedule of 350 weeks. The law has now been
amended to provide that a bodily disability of ten percent or less is
applied to a schedule of 175 weeks; a disability above ten percent
and up to fifty percent continues to be applied to the schedule of
350 weeks; and a disability in excess of fifty percent but less than
1. 1978 Fla. Laws, ch. 78-300, § 23 provides: "In recognition of the seriousness of the
problems in the existing [workmen's compensation] system and the urgent need for major
reform, Chapter 440, Florida Statutes is repealed as of July 1, 1979."
2. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(1)(b) (2) (Supp. 1978). This was the state of the law prior to July
1, 1974, at which time coverage was made compulsory for employers of one or more employees.
3. Id. § 440.02(2)(d)(3)(a)-(b).
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and including ninety percent is applied to a schedule of 525 weeks.4
This reduces by one-half the amount of allowable benefits for a
bodily injury to employees at the lower end of the disability spec-
trum and somewhat increases the allowable number of weeks for
employees at the upper end of that spectrum.
This provision is in keeping with the intent of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. The new schedule, however, presents some
practical problems. There is a benefit differential between individu-
als with ten percent and eleven percent bodily disability ratings
which is grossly disproportionate to a one percent difference in disa-
bility. In addition, no change was made in the "scheduled" injuries'
listed in section 440.15(3)(a)-(p) of the Florida Statute. This failure
has resulted in an illogical allowance of benefits. ,Fpr example, a ten
percent disability to the arm is a lesser medical disability than a ten
percent disability to the body; yet, the schedule for the arm disabil-
ity now allows a greater number of weeks than the schedule for a
ten percent bodily disability.
The trial judge is foreclosed from awarding compensation for a
physical impairment disability greater than the greatest disability
given the claimant by any examining or treating physician, except
by stipulation of the parties,' a virtually nonexistent situation.
C. Determination of Wage-Earning Capacity
It is now provided that a claim for diminution of wage-earning
capacity shall not mature until ninety days after the employee has
reached maximum medical improvement.7 In cases falling within
section 440.15(3)(u) of the Florida Statute dealing with "other
cases," the injured employee is entitled to the greater of either im-
pairment rating or diminution of earning capacity.8 The purpose of
the delayed determination concerning loss of earning capacity in
excess of anatomical impairment is to prevent a premature determi-
nation of loss of earning capacity which might not reflect actual loss.
This statutory change is of little importance except for its potential
4. 1978 Fla. Laws ch. 78-300, § 5 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(u) (Supp. 1978)).
5. All compensation benefits under the workmen's compensation law are, technically,
scheduled benefits. Weekly benefits are paid based upon statutorily established schedules
ranging all the way to life time benefits for permanent total disability. Common usage by
practitioners and the judiciary, however, utilizes the terminology "scheduled injuries" to refer
to those schedules in (a) through (t) as distinguished from the schedule in (u), termed
"other cases," which deals with bodily injuries not set forth in FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(a)-(t)
(Supp..1978).
6. Id. § 440.25(3)(b).
7. Id. § 440.25(3)(a).
8. Id, § 440.15(3)(u).
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to encourage additional litigation. This is true because (1) as a
practical matter, hearings on permanency are not obtained until
considerably longer than three months after determination of the
issue of maximum medical improvement and (2) without establish-
ing a record of postaccident earnings or of a substantial job search,
no loss of earning capacity will be found. An initial determination
of permanent impairment, however, as well as a subsequent deter-
mination as to loss of earning capacity, are allowable, thereby creat-
ing the possibility of additional litigation.
In connection with the determination of loss of earning capac-
ity, the Act now codifies established judicial criteria and requires
the judge to make written findings of fact supporting any loss of
earning capacity award."' It has always been sound practice to ex-
plain an award for loss of earning capacity; therefore, the gloss of
this statutory addition is more apparent than real.
D. Attorney's Fees
Attorney's fees were again under attack and the 1978 Florida
Legislature made a significant policy change by inserting a new
provision in the previously governing section:
With respect to attorney's fees on claims for benefits other than
medical benefits, 75 percent shall be paid by the employer or
carrier and 25 percent shall be paid by the claimant; however, the
employer or carrier shall pay all of the attorney's fees if the claim-
ant proves to the judge that the employer or carrier handled his
claim in a negligent, arbitrary or capricious manner."
The insertion of this provision presents a host of problems. The
previous provision for payment of attorney's fees when the em-
ployer/carrier did not timely and voluntarily present payment of
benefits'" may have encompassed those instances of negligence on
the part of the employer/carrier to which the new provision is ad-
dressed. Hence, the change may have been unnecessary. Moreover,
because attorney's fees are due, the judge may feel compelled to
determine the responsibility of the employer/carrier for all attor-
ney's fees. The threat of attorney's fees created by the statutory
9. See Florida Cuttings, Inc. v. Garcia, I.R.C. Order 2-3170 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n
May 31, 1977); Poston Bridge & Iron Co. v. Lawler, I.R.C. Order 2-3160 (Fla. Indus. Rel.
Comm'n May 19, 1977).
10. FLA. STAT. § 440.25 (3)(c) (Supp. 1978).
11. 1978 Fla. Laws ch. 78-300, § 10 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.34(1) (Supp. 1978)).
12. Timely acceptance, according to FLA. STAT. § 440.34(1) (Supp. 1978) is "on or before
the 21st day after they [the employer or carrier] have notice."
[Vol. 33:1391
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revision may force the insurance company and claimant to negotiate
those fees when the latter is charged with a portion of them. The
result may be a process that is so cumbersome that it would be
simpler to have a judge allocate the fees, creating additional litiga-
tion.
E. Delivery Process
The payment delivery process has long been plagued by prob-
lems which have encouraged attorney involvement. In this regard,
several beneficial changes were. adopted. It is now provided that
weekly compensation payments, except for the first week, shall be
paid by check. 3 Previously, drafts with a clearing time of up to
several weeks were utilized. Penalties have been increased from ten
to twenty percent on late payment of installments of compensa-
tion."1 It is provided that interest is due at the rate of twelve percent
for installments not timely paid. 5 At the prior statutory interest
rates of six and then of eight percent, it was financially beneficial
to the employer/carrier to withhold payment of benefits and to file
questionable appeals in order to retain the use of the funds over a
longer period of time. The amended provision eliminates the eco-
nomic benefits garnered by such conduct.
Procedural changes in the delivery process have been effec-
tuated to achieve more prompt receipt of benefits. The amendments
provide that when a claimant is represented by counsel, final settle-
ment through a joint petition and stipulation shall be approved by
the judge within seven days of its filing unless the judge determines,
in his discretion, that testimony is necessary. 6 The requirement of
a hearing where a claimant is not represented is retained. Judges of
Industrial Claims or the Industrial Relations Commission are re-
quired to report on cases not determined within thirty days of final
hearing or within 180 days of filing an application for review. 7
F. Fraud
Concern with allegations of fraud in workmen's compensation
proceedings led to the adoption of demeaning and meaningless pro-
visions; existing criminal law already precluded such fraudulent
13. Id. § 440.12(1).
14. Id. § 440.20(5).
15. Id. § 440.20(7).
16. Id. § 440.20(10).
17. Id. § 440.25(3)(d).
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conduct.18 The new general antifraud provision, entitled
"Misrepresentation; fraudulent activities; penalties" and directed
at the claimant, claimant's attorney and medical practitioner, at-
tempts to prevent deceitful activity."9 In addition, the statute re-
quires that the medical practitioner furnish a sworn statement that
the treatment was reasonable and necessary.20 The legislators failed
to recognize that because the workmen's compensation law provides
medical care which is rendered under the direction of the em-
ployer/carrier, there is already overwhelming control via the author-
ization or withholding of such care and via the payment of bills.
Nevertheless, it is now incumbent upon practitioners, the vast ma-
jority of whom are initially selected by the employer or carrier, to
attach such a statement to reports submitted. This meaningless
provision demeans the medical profession.
Judges of Industrial Claims appropriately have been made sub-
ject to the Code of Judicial Conduct.2 Also, initial appointment of
the Judges of Industrial Claims is now accomplished in the manner
previously established for reappointment. That is, the judges are
chosen from a list of at least three persons nominated by the judicial
nominating commission for the appellate district in which the judge
will principally conduct hearings.2
III. CASE LAW
A. Attorney's Fees
The trend when dealing with issues of entitlement to a fee and
the amount of fees awarded, as discussed in this article last year,2
3
has continued. In State v. Paulk, 2' the court reversed an award of a
18. Id. § 626.9541(21)(a) (1977) provided: "Any agent, physician, claimant, or other
person who causes to be presented to any insurer a false claim for payment, knowing the same
to be false . . . shall . . . be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree .
19. Id. § 440.37 (Supp. 1978).
20. Id. § 440.13(1).
21. Id. § 440.442.
22. Id. § 440.45.
23. Keyfetz, Workmen's Compensation, 1977 Developments in Florida Law, 32 U. MIAMI
L. Rev. 1333, 1334-39 (1978).
24. I.R.C. Order 2-3569 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Oct. 13, 1978)(S).
Written decisions of the Industrial Relations Commission are reprinted and distributed
by that body through a decisional law service. The suffix (S) involving an Industrial Rela-
tions Commission decision stands for "Survived" reflecting the fact that neither party sought
review by the Supreme Court of Florida or agreed to dismissal of any proceedings sought.
Where no supreme court proceedings have taken place and the suffix (S) is absent, the case
reported may still be pending for review in the supreme court. Selected decisions of the
Industrial Relations Commission and its predecessor are also reported in Florida Compensa-
tion Reports.
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$12,000 fee representing a rate of $300 per hour, noting that there
was nothing particularly unusual in the case and therefore the
amount of the fee, considering the work involved, was excessive.
Similarly, in United States Steel Corp. v. Green,25 the Supreme
Court of Florida found a fee of $13,000 excessive in view of the work
performed. In a footnote to that opinion, the supreme court stated
that the guidelines recommending a "sliding scale," adopted by the
legislature subsequent to the accident in question, could "eliminate
the need for remands in future cases.""6 The court appeared to indi-
cate that where there was adherence to the guidelines, the amount
would not be disturbed. It can also be inferred that where the award
of benefits is large, an emphasis will be placed on the time involved.
At the same time, if benefits are smaller but greater work is in-
volved, there is the danger that the judicial emphasis will be solely
on the amount of benefits and the appropriate guidelines rather
than the work involved.
Kings Point West, Inc. v. Flint7 involved an error by the trial
judge in excluding consideration of supplemental benefits. Notwith-
standing that error, the award of an attorney's fee of $11,000 was
affirmed upon the grounds that benefits are only one factor to be
considered.? In the reverse situation, however, where the award of
benefits was disturbed on appeal, these authors are unaware of any
decisions where the court affirmed an awarded fee on the same
basis. Rather, in such cases, the cause was invariably remanded for
redetermination of the amount of the fee in view of the change in
benefits.
Where services rendered are a factor and testimony by the
claimant's counsel is relevant, the question arises as to whether
defense counsel may review claimant counsel's file in connection
with cross-examination. This situation poses a conflict between the
doctrine of privilege and the right to have meaningful cross-
examination. In Frost v. Gasparilla Inn,29 the court held that a
claimant attorney's file must be produced for in camera inspection
so that the judge may determine what portions should be furnished
to defense counsel. To be sure, the nature of counsel's work and the
fees charged are a probative factor. Whether this doctrine will also
25. 353 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 1977).
26. Id. at 89 n.9; see FLA. STAT. § 440.34(1) (Supp. 1978).
27. I.R.C. Order 2-3516 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Aug. 30, 1978). See also City of St.
Cloud v. Maloy, I.R.C. Order 2-2935 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Mar. 12, 1976), cert. denied,
348 So. 2d 945 (1977).
28. I.R.C. Order 2-3516.
29. I.R.C. Order 2-3526 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Sept. 7, 1978).
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allow in camera inspection by the judge of the work and the billings
of defense counsel remains to be seen. Unquestionably, future deci-
sions will have to specify further what is and is not subject to in
camera inspection by the judge.
In the area of entitlement to a fee, two apparently conflicting
lines of precedent have evolved, represented by Davis v. Green"' and
Lehigh Portland Cement Co. v. Branch."' The Davis case places on,
the employer/carrier the duty to investigate benefits due. If they fail
to do so and claimant prevails on his compensation claim, a fee is
due. In the Lehigh Portland Cement case, no fee was held due
because there was a delay by the attending physician in submitting
a report and a timely acceptance by the employer/carrier followed
receipt of the rating report. The resolution of the conflict between
these cases may lie with a vague synthesis requiring the em-
ployer/carrier to act reasonably within a reasonable time after re-
ceipt of appropriate information.
Osteen v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.3" involved a claim for perma-
nent total disability benefits. A letter from claimant's counsel had
notified the carrier that the treating physician had found a perma-
nent impairment of twenty-five percent of the claimant's body.
Apparently, no written report had been prepared by the physician,
but upon reciept of the doctor's deposition arranged by claimant's
counsel, the carrier accepted the demand for permanent total disa-
bility benefits. The commission held that the carrier had a duty to
investigate promptly upon receipt of the communication from
claimant's counsel and, the carrier having failed to do so, that an
attorney's fee was due.
In accordance with this analysis, another court denied entitle-
ment to an attorney's fee where there was timely inquiry of the
attending physician by the carrier after the filing of a claim.33 Two
confused ratings had been given by the physician. Although aware
of the greater rating, the carrier continued paying the lower rating
for many months. Nevertheless, the commission emphasized that
no claim had been pending and within twenty-one days of the claim
being filed, the carrier did timely act to clarify the situation. Al-
though emphasizing timely inquiry, the opinion does not reflect the
time lapse between the filing of the claim and the carrier's ultimate
payment of the greater rating; presumably, the lapse was more than
30. 240 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1970).
31. 319 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1975).
32. I.R.C. Order 2-3383 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Mar. 24, 1978).
33. Traylor, Inc. v. Farmer, I.R.C. Order 2-3412 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Apr. 26,1978).
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twenty-one days. Accordingly, this decision seems to extend the
necessary time for action by the carrier. The holding appears to
make sufficient an inquiry within twenty-one days of the filing of a
claim as distinguished from finding out and paying within that
period. Just when the inquiry and payment should be made in order
to escape liability for attorney's fees apparently depends on the
vague concept of "reasonableness."
Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Gillum3' further extends the time
for action by the employer/carrier. In that case, a claim was filed
but the employer/carrier did not receive notice of it until it received
a copy of the acknowledgement of the filing from the Workmen's
Compensation Bureau in Tallahassee. The employer/carrier acted
within twenty-one days of receiving that acknowledgment, but not
within twenty-one days of the filing of the claim. The decision held
that the twenty-one day period began to run upon notice to the
employer of the claim, that the employer's action was timely and
that no attorney's fee was due. 5
Thomas v. City of Vero Beach" involved an employer/carrier
seeking a reduction of benefits because the claimant was receiving
social security payments. During the course of the proceedings, the
employer/carrier agreed to pay an average weekly wage in excess of
that contended for previously. By virtue of this agreement, the
amount of the reduction the employer/carrier sought was decreased
and the compensation payments were increased. An attorney's fee
was found due.
Lombardo v. BBC Agency, Inc. 11 involved a fee at the appellate
level although at that point no benefits were due. Prior to this
decision, it had often been necessary for a claimant to obtain coun-
sel to assist him in appellate proceedings on a double contingency
basis, i.e., payment required success in the appellate tribunal and
then success in actually obtaining benefits. Lombardo points out
that the separate statutory provision 3 dealing with proceedings on
review does not predicate the allowance of attorney's fees on obtain-
34. I.R.C. Order 2-3534 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Sept. 12, 1978)(S).
35. In the early days of the workmen's compensation law the 21-day provision was
construed to run from the date of notice of injury and entitlement to benefits rather than from
the date of actual filing of a claim. In Carillon Hotel v. Rodriguez, 124 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1960),
however, the court construed the 21-day period as commencing when the claim was actually
filed rather than when notice of claim or injury was given. Gilum now appears to broaden
the period so that the time period does not commence running until the claim is actually filed
and there is notice to the employer/carrier of that claim.
36. 365 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1978).
37. I.R.C. Order 2-3049 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Oct. 19, 1976)(S).
38. FLA. STAT. § 440.34(3) (Supp. 1978).
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ing any particular benefits, but leaves the award of or increase of
attorney's fees to the discretion of the reviewing tribunal.
B. Arising Out of and in the Course of Employment
Typically, recent changes in this area have further limited cov-
erage. In addition, there has been helpful clarification regarding
what is known as the "aggressor" defense.
1. THE "AGGRESSOR DOCTRINE"
In the past, the rule has been that injuries to an "aggressor" are
held not to arise out of and in the course of employment. The exact
basis for such a conclusion, however, was not specified and there
was an accompanying failure to analyze appropriately the issue of
entitlement to or denial of benefits. 9 Finally, in Lorie v. Yale Ogron
Manufacturing Co.," the court explained that the basis for the ap-
plication of this defense was the statutory proscription against enti-
tlement to benefits in cases where there was a willful intent to injure
oneself or another." Meaningful analysis, however, was thereafter
disregarded, as in the case of Cutler v. Sterling Hotel2 in which the
claimant commenced an altercation by giving a small push to a co-
worker who responded by striking the claimant with a pot brush.
The claimant was held to be the aggressor and thus not entitled to
benefits. The nature of the claimant's injury was not described; it
is unclear whether the coworker overreacted to the push or whether
he reacted reasonably such that the claimant's injuries were defen-
sively inflicted and commensurate with the claimant's initial ac-
tion.
It is suggested that a claimant precipitating an altercation
should not be viewed as an outlaw. Instead, the question of whether
the injury resulted from a willful intent to injure another must
depend upon the nature of the claimant's action and the appropri-
ateness of the reaction which causes him injury. A small shove an-
swered by a small shove and consequent injuries should be grounds
for recovery. A small shove resulting in a coemployee's leaving the
room, obtaining a knife and stabbing the claimant, however, should
not be grounds for a denial of benefits.
In the recent decision of American International Land Corp. v.
39. See Tucker Taxi, Inc. v. Schofield, 107 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958).
40. I.R.C. Order 2-2245 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Feb. 26, 1973), cert. denied, 277 So.
2d 286 (Fla. 1973).
41. FLA. STAT. § 440.09(3) (1977).
42. I.R.C. Order 2-3294 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Dec. 20, 1977)(S).
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May, 13 the judiciary at long last appears to have better analyzed the
issue. In that case, claimant May and his supervisor had a verbal
altercation. When the supervisor returned to his pickup truck after
reprimanding May, claimant approached the pickup truck in which
the supervisor was seated and grabbed the supervisor's arm. The
supervisor got out of the truck and knocked May down. Although
May's action constituted a technical battery, and the label of ag-
gressor could be applied to him, his actions should not deprive him
of benefits on the grounds of a willful intent to injure. The commis-
sion's opinion appropriately noted the language in Lorie and
pointed out that "the aggressor doctrine represents in this jurisdic-
tion the decisional definition of 'willful intent to injure.' "' Unfor-
tunately, the commission then resorted to the use of the label
"aggressor" and held that, under the circumstances, the claimant
was not an aggressor. Although the result was sound, the reasoning
would have been less conclusory had the commission avoided the
labels of aggressor or non-aggressor which are simply legal substi-
tutes for saying that one employee should recover and another
should not.
2. THE "GOING AND COMING" EXCLUSIONARY RULE
There has been some retrenchment in the "going and coming"
area. The general rule is that injuries incurred in travel to or from
work are not covered except when travel is provided by the em-
ployer, 5 pursuant to a special request by the employer," or when the
employee is on call to such an extent and under such job require-
ments that he is viewed as covered at all times during the entire
term of his employment . 7
In M.J. Kelley v. Anderson, 8 a case of first impression, the
employer was required by union contract to pay the employee a
travel allowance. The claimant properly contended that this allow-
ance fell within the requirement of travel provided by the employer
and argued that an injury suffered during the course of such travel
was compensable. For the first time, the commission distinguished
between employer payment for travel in the form of an extra allow-
43. I.R.C. Order 2-3404 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Apr. 19, 1978).
44. Id. at 3 (quoting Lorie, I.R.C. Order 2-2245, at 3).
45. M.J. Kelley Co. v. Anderson, I.R.C. Order 2-3466 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n June 30,
1978).
46. Feltner v. Southern Bell, 274 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1973).
47. Friese v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, I.R.C. Order 2-3268 (Fla. Indus. Rehl. Comm'n Nov.
10, 1977), cert. denied, 362 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1978).
48. I.R.C. Order 2-3466 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n June 30, 1978).
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ance-akin to an increase in wages-for the distance from the job
site and payment which contemplated travel as an inherent part of
employment. Although such a distinction is theoretically sound, as
a practical matter it is a tenuous, fluctuating premise upon which
to rest differential treatment of employees. In the Anderson opinion,
the commission discussed Swartzer v. Food Fair Stores, Inc.,"
where injuries were compensable in a fact pattern in which car
expenses were paid to an employee in exchange for his agreement
to transfer to a more distant store. Exactly what falls within the
control of the Swartzer precedent, as distinguished from the M.J.
Kelley precedent, is unclear. For example, are there legal distinc-
tions between providing a bus to pick up the claimant, providing a
company motor vehicle to the claimant, and providing payment to
a claimant for use of his motor vehicle? In the latter case, is it
important whether payment is made due to transfer of employment
location or made because a union contract demands that travel
expenses must be paid for an employee who works beyond a certain
point?
In Friese v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 5 0 a police officer was travel-
ing by motorcycle from his home to police headquarters when he was
injured. The commission held it erroneous to apply the going and
coming exclusion to police officers in light of the Supreme Court of
Florida cases expressly exempting police officers from the rule. The
rationale for such axi exception, first stated in Sweat v. Allen5 and
later affirmed in Warg v. City of Miami Springs,5" was that police
officers are " 'continuously intrusted with certain duties, namely,
to protect the peace and safety of the community.'-53 A vigorous
dissent5' pointed out that the application of Sweat had been re-
stricted in several later cases, e.g., where the injury to the policeman
occurred outside of his official jurisdiction. In City of Miami Beach
v. Valeriani,5 5 a Miami Beach police officer, en route to work, ob-
served a traffic violation, attempted to make an arrest and was
assulted. Compensation was denied because the officer's authority
did not extend to the City of Miami where the arrest was made.
Sweat was limited further in Leeds v. City of Miami,5" where a
49. 175 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1965).
50. I.R.C. Order 2-3268 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Nov. 10, 1977), cert. denied, 362 So.
2d 1051 (Fla. 1978).
51. 145 Fla. 733, 200 So. 348 (1941).
52. 249 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1971).
53. Id. at 5 (quoting Sweat, 145 Fla. at 738, 200 So.,at 350).
54. I.R.C. Order 2-3268, at 3 (Carroll, Comm'r, dissenting).
55. 137 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1962).
56. I.R.C. Order 2-894 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n 1959), cert. denied, 122 So. 2d 474 (Fla.
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policeman was deemed to be performing a "personal mission" at the
time of injury. In Leeds, the police officer, while driving a city car,
was injured in a traffic accident on his way from school to work.
Compensation was denied on the grounds that the officer was on a
personal mission. The dissent in Friese suggested that:
Police officers should not be placed in a more favored category
for compensation purposes, without some acceptable supporting
reason. If the potential of a requirement for action in their official
capacity may become a reality any time during the twenty-four
hour day, then such extended coverage should not be limited
merely to the time consumed traveling to and from work, but
should also embrace any travel under circumstances in which
they are exposed to some occurrence that may require official
action. If such a result is deemed desirable, it should be accom-
plished by appropriate legislation."
Until such time as legislative action is taken, or the judiciary
seeks to clarify further the application of this exception, it appears
that while theoretically a policeman is continually entrusted with
law enforcement, the policeman can be assured of workmen's com-
pensation coverage only while en route to and from work and within
the geographical limits of his authority as a police officer. During
all nonworking periods and in all other locales, their injuries, even
if sustained in the process of making an arrest, will very likely be
deemed noncompensable. The dissent appropriately pointed out the
lack of logic in this decision. A result of coverage any time while in
the public domain or of no coverage except during the performance
of work-related duties could be justified. But a rule excepting po-
licemen from the going and coming rule just during the particular
moments of coming from or going to work is incongruous and with-
out any rational justification.
C. Preexisting Conditions
The treatment of preexisting conditions in workmen's compen-
sation involves the appplication of apportionment which may re-
duce benefits. A misrepresentation as to a preexisting physical con-
dition and the method of applying apportionment, as well as the
doctrine of merger may affect benefits.
1960). See also DeSalvo v. Sheriff of Broward County, I.R.C. Order 2-2890 (Fla. Indus. Rel.
Comm'n Dec. 17, 1975), cert. denied, 334 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 1976).
57. I.R.C. Order 2-3268, at 3.
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1. MISREPRESENTATION AS TO PREEXISTING PHYSICAL CONDITIONS
The leading decision in this area is Martin v. Carpenter." In
that case, claimant misrepresented a previous back injury on an
employment application. While working with the Martin Company,
her condition became worse absent any specific, identifiable event
related to the aggravation of the injury. Her claim was denied on
the ground that there was no accident, i.e., no unexpected or unu-
sual event or result, happening suddenly. The Supreme Court of
Florida said in dicta, however, that a false representation as to
physical condition or health made by an employee in procuring
employment would preclude the benefits of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act if: (1) there was a causal relationship between the
injury and the false representation; (2) the employee knew the rep-
resentation to be false; (3) the employer relied upon the false repre-
sentation; and (4) such reliance resulted in consequent injury to the
employer."
The supreme court's original intention was that the doctrine
serve as a shield to protect the employer from unfair payments.
Faulty analysis and misunderstanding of the rule, however, has led
to its more frequent use as a sword cutting off claimant's rights. The
most recent decision in this area is Montgomery Ward v.
Provenzano.60 The claimant therein was asked whether he had ever
been admitted to an institution, sanitarium or hospital. Though he
answered "no," in fact claimant had been confined to an army
psychiatric hospital and discharged with a psychiatric disability.
Claimant commenced his employment with Montgomery Ward
more than twenty years later and worked for the company for eight
years prior to his compensable accident, a fractured hip which re-
sulted in a permanent disability of the left lower extremity. Finding
that, as a result of orthopedic injury, the claimant had suffered
anxiety neurosis with conversion symptions requiring the need for
psychiatric care, the trial judge awarded temporary disability bene-
fits and continued psychiatric treatment. In reversing the award of
those benefits, the majority decided that the claimant had misrep-
resented a nervous disorder on an employment application; that the
condition was subsequently aggravated by an industrial injury; that
had full information originally been given, the claimant would have
been subjected to further screening by the company doctor; and
58. 132 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1961).
59. Id. at 406.
60. I.R.C. Order 2-3533 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Sept. 11, 1978)./
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under those circumstances, the employer had met the Martin test."
The trial judge had rejected this defense on the ground that the
employment application had been filled out subsequent to hiring,
and there was no competent substantial evidence that the applica-
tion had been reviewed after it was completed or that the employer
had actually relied upon it.12 The majority opinion is harsh and
ignores the realities of the employment relation. It compounds such
ignorance with faulty analysis by extending too far the legal doc-
trine originally articulated in dicta. The causal relation between the
original injury (a broken hip) and the false representation is not
apparent. It was not a situation where the psychiatric disability, if
one existed, contributed to causing the initial injury. In addition,
employer reliance was minimal, and it is questionable whether that
reliance resulted in any injury to the employer who had had the
benefit of the services of the employee for more than eight years.
2. APPORTIONMENT
Apportionment is proper when it would be unfair to have an
employer pay for that portion of an injury attributable to a condi-
tion not caused by the employment-related accident or to have an
employee pay for a worsening in his condition that would not have
happened but for the accident:
[The apportionment statute] recognizes the maxim that the
employer takes the employee as he finds him, in that it does not
charge against the employee diseased or weakened conditions
which were not and would not have been disabling without the
accident. On the other hand, it gives the intended effect to [the
statute] by relieving the employer of the burden of paying for
disability which occurred through the normal progress of the dis-
ease and was unrelated to the accident.6 3
There are two categories of apportionment. The first category
arises out of the statutory language:
Where a preexisting disease or anomaly is accelerated or aggra-
vated by accident arising out of and in the course of employment,
only acceleration of death or the acceleration or aggravation of
disability reasonably attributable to the accident shall be com-
pensable with respect to permanent disability or death."
61. Id. at 5.
62. See Smith v. Georgetown Manor Furniture Co., 8 F.C.R. 49 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n
1973), cert. denied, 281 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1973).
63. Evans v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 196 So. 2d 748, 753 (Fla. 1967).
64. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(18) (Supp. 1978).
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The statute only apportions when there is a preexisting "disability."
Although in common parlance disability may'connote injury or im-
pairment, in workmen's compensation law disability is defined in
terms of diminution of wage-earning capacity. 5 Disability is deter-
mined by comparing the injured employee's average weekly wage
prior to injury with his post-accident earning capacity."
The judiciary has thus far failed to analyze properly and to
recognize the paradox involved in this area. In order to award com-
pensation, the court must be able to attribute acceleration or aggra-
vation of the disability to the accident. The court must use the pre-
accident wage rate as the yardstick for measuring the original disa-
bility. Yet the pre-accident wage rate does not reflect such impor-
tant variables as the rate of disability improvement or deterioration.
Hence, the amount of aggravation or acceleration caused by the
accident is impossible to measure. This is especially true if the post-
accident wage capacity does not diminish for some time after the
accident. The judiciary has wrestled with these provisions for years
without arriving at any definitive position. 7 In Evans v. Florida
Industrial Commission,8 the court recognized the deficiency in judi-
cial decisionmaking in this area and attempted a meaningful dis-
cussion on apportionment:
[A]pportionment is proper only when and to the extent that the
pre-existing disease either, (1) was disabling at the time of the
accident and continued to be so at the time the award was made
or (2) was producing no disability at the time of the accident but
through its normal progress is doing so at the time permanent
disability is determined and an award is made.6"
If a claimant is working and earning a particular wage and his
disability is defined in terms of incapacity to earn the particular
wage earned at the time of his accident, when is a preexisting dis-
ease disabling at the time of the accident? The second stated alter-
native is not apportionment for a preexisting disease as it existed
at the time of the accident, but apportionment for a subsequent
worsening. The workmen's compensation law does not allow recov-
ery for a subsequent problem whether it be an independent worsen-
65. " 'Disability' means incapacity because of the injury to earn in the same or any other
employment the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury." Id. §
440.02(9).
66. Id. § 440.15(3)(u).
67. See Evans v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 196 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1967), and cases cited
therein.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 752-53.
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ing of an unrelated preexisting problem or an independently caused
separate injury. Hence, this second alternative does not apportion
out anything that was initially covered. The court has again failed
to establish some rational rule for the general application of the
apportionment provision and has merely added to the already exist-
ing confusion.
Recent commission decisions seem, however, to deal somewhat
better with the inherent paradox and set forth more rational stan-
dards as to apportionment under this section. The underlying logic
and rationale in these decisions leads to the conclusion that appor-
tionment cannot be truly effectuated. The proper trend was estab-
lished in Dillon v. Bill's Trailer Sales, Inc., 70 which involved a preex-
isting, asymptomatic, twenty-five percent impairment which, in
conjunction with injuries in a compensable accident, resulted in a
forty-five percent anatomical impairment. It was contended that
apportipnment was applicable. The commission held it inapplica-
ble on the basis that the preexisting condition was asymptomatic
and did not cause any disability prior to the compensable accident.
The same result was reached in a later decision, Richey v. Peninsu-
lar Casket Co.,7' which held apportionment inapplicable to a preex-
isting impairment except where a loss of earning capacity had been
awarded. The commission relied solely on case precedent to support
its determination." In a situation where a pulmonary disease was
triggered by the work, but the lower tribunal found that the condi-
tion had been aggravated by smoking, it was also held that an order
directing apportionment was improper. 3 After finding that the work
had unquestionably contributed to the ultimate result, the commis-
sion held that the testimony fell short of showing any preexisting or
independently caused disability on an earning capacity loss basis at
the time of the award, as is required for apportionment.
The language in the above decisions reflects a continuing lack
of resolution regarding the application of the statutory language.
This lack of resolution is further evidenced by the decision in
Contractors Services v. Garoutte7' where a preexisting heart condi-
tion, aggravated by a compensable heart attack, resulted in total
disability. The medical testimony reflected that the preexisting con-
dition without the work trauma would not have produced the heart
70. I.R.C. Order 2-3323 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Jan. 16, 1978)(S).
71. I.R.C. Order 2-3458 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n June 15, 1978)(S).
72. See Genereux v. Caribbean Concessions, Inc., 211 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1968).
73. Kerr-McGee Chem. Co. v. Griffin, I.R.C. Order 2-3511 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n
Sept. 22, 1978)(S).
74. I.R.C. Order 2-3514 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Sept. 28, 1978).
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attack and the ensuing disability, nor would the heart attack have
occurred from the work trauma without the preexisting coronary
condition. The trial judge apportioned out only ten percent for the
preexisting condition. 5 With such evidence resulting in only ten
percent apportionment, the commission seems to have begged the
question and retreated to the governing confusion by simply affirm-
ing the award as rendered. If, as the evidence reflected, the preexist-
ing condition was not a disability and would not have produced any
disability, then all the "disability" (loss of earning capacity) follow-
ing the compensable accident was produced by the compensable
accident and it is difficult to comprehend what there was to appor-
tion out.
The second type of apportionment is for permanent disability
benefits previously paid. This apportionment provision reduces the
award by the amount of such benefits previously paid under the
Florida Workmen's Compensation Law where a previously compen-
sated permanent impairment has been merged with a permanent
impairment from a new compensable injury, the combination of
which is greater than would have resulted from the subsequent in-
jury considered alone.7" This provision allows apportionment of the
award only when there is a new permanent partial disability, but
not when the new injury is classified as permanent total disability."
The requirements for this apportionment provision are: (1) that
permanent disability benefits were previously paid; (2) that such
benefits were paid under Florida Workmen's Compensation Law;
and (3) that the preexisting impairment merges with the permanent
impairment in the compensable injury for which overall compensa-
tion is awarded. This type of apportionment was applied in Gilchrist
County Board of Commissions v. Davis.7" The claimant had pre-
viously received permanent benefits for a thirty percent disability
of the leg and benefits for another compensable injury to ten percent
of the body. The injury in question was not fully apparent from the
opinion, but the trial judge held that the compensable injury had
merged with the impairments from the two preexisting compen-
75. It should be noted that there was no evidence as to the amount of any apportionment.
Apportionment is an affirmative defense and without evidence thereof, apportionment had
previously been held inapplicable. See G & L Motor Corp. v. Taylor, 182 So. 2d 609 (Fla.
1966); Hastings v. City of Ft. Lauderdale Fire Dep't, 178 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 1965). But cf.
Tolvanen v. Eastern Air Lines, 287 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1973) (even where judge does not indicate
which evidence he relied on, apportionment between two compensable injuries is proper).
76. FiA. STAT. § 440.15(5)(c) (Supp. 1978).
77. Media Gen. Corp. v. Printing Pressmen & Assistants' Union, I.R.C. Order 2-3468
(Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n June 30, 1978).
78. I.R.C. Order 2-3084 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Dec. 29, 1976)(S).
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sated accidents, resulting in a permanent partial disability of
seventy-five percent of the body. Claimant was held entitled to an
award for overall permanency less the amount of permanency for
which he had previously been compensated.
3. MERGER
The concept of merger has had almost as tortured a history as
has the concept of apportionment. Recent commission decisions,
however, explain the concept more rationally and establish guide-
lines for its application. The issue can be simply stated: When there
is a preexisting impairment, at what point can and should that
impairment be combined with a new compensable injury to provide
claimant with a recovery which considers the combined effect? An
early example is Sharer v. Hotel Corporation of America," where an
elderly claimant of limited education previously had lost his left
hand. Subsequently, he suffered a compensable injury which caused
a forty percent disability of the right hand. With a good right hand,
claimant presumably had been able to compensate for his preexist-
ing injury. Obviously, the subsequent significant compensable im-
pairment to the right hand had a far greater impact on this claimant
because of the previous loss of his left hand. The trial judge held
that the compensable injury should be merged with the preexisting
injury, resulting in an award substantially greater than that which
would have been given had the right hand alone been considered.
The claimant was awarded benefits for a fifty-nine percent perma-
nent partial disability of the body measured by his loss of wage-
earning capacity. 0
In merger, as in apportionment, there is also some paradox
since a preexisting impairment, if combined with a subsequent in-
jury, will always result in a disability materially and substantially
greater than that of a subsequent compensable injury considered
alone. It is apparent, however, that the legislative intent was not to
compensate for all preexisting impairments in conjunction with
later compensable impairments. The key words, which partly re-
solve the difficulty, are "materially and substantially greater." Al-
though a definitive analysis and application of the doctrine in ac-
cordance with the statutory language may not be possible, the Com-
79. 144 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1962).
80. Although the compensable injury involving the right hand was a scheduled injury,
when considering the preexisting injury which at that time required knowledge by the em-
ployer (which was obvious), the court properly treated the case as being governed by FLA.
STAT. § 440.15(3)(u) (Supp. 1978) dealing with "other cases," i.e., body injuries. For a more
recent decision, see Williamson v. Bush & LaFoe, 294 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1974).
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mission's recent decisions have attempted to state the law coher-
ently and to establish guidelines for application of this doctrine.
Several principles have emerged. First, merger is not invariably
applied to a compensable injury and subsequent illness or injury.8'
Therefore, those conditions that do merge must be isolated and the
prerequisites for such merger must be stated. It had been consis-
tently held that employer knowledge of the preexisting impairment
was a prerequisite for merger."2 In a recent decision, however, Media
General Corp. v. Printing Pressmen & Assistant's Union, 3 the com-
mission, in a well-reasoned opinion which traced the state of the law
in this area and synthesized it with apportionment, held that knowl-
edge was no longer necessary to apply merger rather than apportion-
ment under section 440.02(18) of the Florida Statutes. 4 Knowledge
is still necessary for reimbursement to the employer/carrier from the
Special Disability Trust Fund,8" but it is no longer necessary to
achieve full compensation benefits for the claimant. Finally, there
must be a finding of merger as distinguished from a mere addition
of disabilities. 7 In other words, application of merger requires a
showing that the compensable injury magnified and enhanced the
preexisting condition or was itself magnified and enhanced by the
preexisting condition. 8
81. Fisher v. Fisher Constr. Co., 212 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1968); Poston Bridge & Iron v.
Newcombe, I.R.C. Order 2-3363 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Feb. 22, 1978).
82. See, e.g., Genereux v. Caribbean Concessions, Inc., 211 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1968).
83. I.R.C. Order 2-3468 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n June 30, 1978).
84. In previous statutes the apportionment provision referred to was FLA. STAT. §
440.02(19) (1935) which has been renumbered FLA. STAT. § 440.02(18) (1974).
85. The Special Disabilities Trust Fund was created by FLA. STAT. §§ 440.49(5)(h)(I)-
(2) (Supp. 1978), which provides for maintenance of the fund "by annual assessments upon
the insurance companies writing compensation insurance in the state and the self-insurers
under this chapter." Sections 440.49(5)(c)-(g) outline the scope of the employer's right to
reimbursement from the fund.
86. The Commission pointed out that the purpose of the Special Disability Trust Fund
was to encourage employment of the handicapped by reimbursing the employer from the
special fund for any excess payments made as a result of the combination of a compensable
injury with a preexisting condition. That purpose could be defeated if claimant's entitlement
to the benefits of merger were predicated upon a showing of knowledge by the employer. If
through the doctrine of merger, greater benefits are given to the injured claimant only where
the employer knows of the preexisting condition, the employer will not be encouraged to hire
the handicapped, since he will be subjecting himself to the payment of greater benefits with
the possibility of recoupment. The purpose would be better served if full benefits were due
with or without that knowledge. The employer then, upon a showing of knowledge of the
preexisting condition, could seek recoupment from the Special Disability Fund.
87. Special Disability Trust Fund v. Mayer, I.R.C. Order 2-3349 (Fla. Indus. Rel.
Comm'n Feb. 13, 1978)(S); Cohen-Ager, Inc. v. Pierce, I.R.C. Order 2-3173 (Fla. Indus. Rel.
Comm'n June 2, 1977)(S).
88. Media Gen. Corp. v. Printing Pressman & Assistants' Union, I.R.C. Order 2-3468
(Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n June 30, 1978).
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Merger was found in Southeastern Plastering v. DeLucca,89
where preexisting gastric problems combined with a compensable
leg injury and resulted in a fifty percent permanent bodily disabil-
ity, measured by loss of wage-earning capacity. Medications neces-
sary for treatment of the leg injury affected and magnified the
preexisting gastric conditions, thereby aggravating the disability. In
Special Disability Trust Fund v. City of Gainesville,"0 the judge
found merger where claimant had a preexisting leg impairment and
a compensable back injury. The commission reversed, explaining
that there was no evidence "that establishe[d] that the claimant's
permanent impairment from the prior knee problem was enhanced
by the subsequent back injury or that the impairment from the
latter back injury was magnified or enhanced because of the pre-
existing knee impairment."'" This quotation embodies the current
status of the law in its requirements for applying the doctrine of
merger.
D. Accident
Central to the Workmen's Compensation Act is the require-
ment that a compensable injury be the result of an "accident."
Accident as defined by statute is "an unexpected or unusual event
or result, happening suddenly." 3 In addition, the workmen's com-
pensation law provides that benefits may be due for accidents as
defined in section 440.151 of the Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978),
entitled "Occupational Diseases."
The judiciary's failure properly to utilize these alternative defi-
nitions has resulted in confusion and the establishment of a non-
statutory hybrid category referred to as the repeated exposure cases.
Confusion is apparent in early cases such as Meehan v. Crowder,4
where a painter, exposed to bichloride of mercury, developed ne-
phritis due to mercury absorption. The Supreme Court of Florida,
in awarding compensation, reasoned that the entry of the fumes into
the claimant's body was a sudden event. The so-called "exposure"
and "repeated trauma" cases also resulted from failure properly to
utilize statutory definitions. The Supreme Court, in the leading case
89. I.R.C. Order 2-3470 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n July 7, 1978)(S).
90. I.R.C. Order 2-3537 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Sept. 12, 1978)(S).
91. Id. at 3.
92. See generally L. ALPERT, FLORIDA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw §§ 6-1, 6-2 (3d ed.
1978).
93. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(18) (Supp. 1978).
94. 158 Fla. 361, 28 So. 2d 435 (1947).
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of Czepial v. Krohn Roofing Co., 1 held that a roofer disabled by
tuberculosis, caused in part by inhalation of roofing material, had
suffered a compensable injury. "[Tihe fundamentally accidental
nature of the injury is not altered by the fact that, instead of a single
occurrence, it is the cumulative effect of the inhalation of dust and
fumes to which a claimant is peculiarly susceptible that accelerates
a claimant's pre-existing disability."" The exposure cases have
overtaxed the accident concept by holding that each contact with
a deleterious substance is the equivalent to a miniature accident.7
Similarly, with the so-called "repeated trauma" cases, individual
impacts are treated as separate accidents. There is, in fact, no logi-
cal reason for the creation of these separate labels since under this
anaylsis, exposure is fractionalized conceptually so as to make it
indistinguishable from repeated trauma.
The commission has recently confirmed the repeated exposure
hybrid category. In Keller Building Products v. Shirley, 11 the claim-
ant, a carpet installer, was required as part of his occupation, to
strike his knee against a "knee-kicker." The claimant gradually
developed tiny spurs and a cyst in his knee. The injury was charac-
terized by the commission as within a category of compensable
exposures due to repeated traumas. Thus, the commission has ex-
panded the exposure concept to encompass a wide variety of in-
dustrial hazards, including many injuries previously subsumed
under the repeated trauma doctrine.
A careful reading of the statute reveals that the labels and
judicial pronouncements interpreting them are unnecessary. Sec-
tion 440.151 of the Florida Statutes clearly states that occupational
diseases are to be treated as accidents." Section 440.151(2) defines
occupational disease as "a disease which is due to causes and con-
ditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular
trade, occupation, process or employment."' 1 It is clear that the
statutory definition of "accident" is not limited to the "unexpected
or unusual" standard of section 440.02(18) of the Florida Statutes
(Supp. 1978). Once the definition of accident is expanded to in-
clude occupational disease, the facts of all of the above cases can
95. 93 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 1957).
96. Id. at 86.
97. See Worden v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, 256 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1972).
98. I.R.C. Order 2-3263 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Feb. 22, 1978), cert. denied, 362 So.
2d 1054 (Fla. 1978).
99. "[T]he disablement or death of an employee resulting from an occupational disease
as hereinafter defined shall be treated as the happening of an injury by accident .... " FLA.
STAT. § 440.151(1)(a) (1974).
100. Id. § 440.151(2).
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be dealt with without resort to fictions such as exposure and re-
peated trauma.
Recent cases still find the commission struggling with the con-
cept of accident and insisting on a demonstrable sudden or unusual
event or result as a threshold for recovery. In Daytona-Budweiser v.
Shelton,'0 ' the claimant aggravated a preexisting herniated disc by
pushing an unbalanced cart along rough pavement. In Richard Per-
ron Construction Co. v. Neiswonder, 0 1 the claimant had previously
suffered a compensable injury to his back which left him in pain
when he did heavy work. Nine months later he sought compensation
for a resurgence of pain occasioned by his moving concrete blocks.
In both of these cases, the commission relied on Martin Co. v.
Carpenter°3 to support their decisions that a sudden event or unu-
sual result was necessary to merit compensation. In Perron, the
commission reasoned that "it was clear that his work constituted
an aggravation of his condition, but an aggravation does not consti-
tute an accident."'' 4 In neither of these cases could the precipitating
incident have been viewed as sudden. Since aggravation of a back
problem through heavy lifting is not unpredictable, the injury can-
not be classified as an accident. Moreover, since..the injury is not
peculiar to the trade, it cannot be classified as an occupational
disease.
Compare these two cases with Allied Products Corp. v. Esgro. "'5
Repeated exposure by the claimant to inordinate noise in his em-
ployment caused a loss of hearing. The commission, stating that
the case was controlled by Brito v. Advance Metal Products, Inc., "0"
held the loss compensable. In Brito, compensation was provided to
a welder who, after years of exposure to smoke, became unable to
breathe properly through his nose. The court in Brito relied on
Victor Wine & Liquor, Inc. v. Beasley'°7 which attempted to clarify
the accident concept.
101. I.R.C. Order 2-3566 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Oct. 10, 1978).
102. I.R.C. Order 2-3417 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Apr. 27, 1978).
103. 132 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1961). In Martin, the court held:
[Ilt is not every aggravation of a preexisting condition which is compensable. In
the case of aggravation of occupational diseases no accidental injury is required
for because of the nature of such diseases the aggravation constitutes the accident
or the injury. Aggravation of other conditions of the body to be compensable must
be the result of an accidental injury and the aggravation cannot constitute an
accident.
Id. at 407.
104. I.R.C. Order 2-3417, at 3.
105. I.R.C. Order 2-3420 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n May 2, 1978), cert. denied, 362 So.
2d 1050 (Fla. 1978).
106. 244 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1971).
107. 141 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1962).
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[D]isability which results from some exposure peculiar to and
constituting a hazard of the employment, operating upon the
physical condition of the employee at the time of such exposure,
is a compensable injury "by accident" within the meaning of the
Act, even though there is no literal "accident" such as a slip or
fall. 108
There is case law as well as statutory language supporting a less
restrictive view of accidental injury. Where the injury can reason-
ably be viewed as an occupational disease, there is no reason to
search for a sudden, identifiable vent or unusual result.
E. Cardiovascular Injuries
The area of heart attack and other cardiovascular injuries has
received considerable judicial attention and substantial changes
have been made in the decisional law.' This area has been carved
out by the judiciary and given its own rules in derogation of the
statute. The leading case, Victor Wine & Liquor, Inc. v. Beasley, "0
held that an internal failure of the heart muscle is no different than
the internal failure of any other muscle-an unusual result happen-
ing suddenly and therefore within the ambit of a statutory accident.
Nevertheless, the court established as their rule that such injuries,
when precipitated by work-connected exertion, are compensable
only when something additional is shown-unusual exertion."' The
basis for this judicial requirement of unusual exertion is never pre-
cisely articulated. The denial of compensation is usually justified on
the basis that there was no accident within the meaning of the
statute. Thus, where a more common type of accident occurs, such
as a slip or fall; compensation for the accompanying heart attack is
allowed." 2 There is little doubt, however, that a heart attack fits
within the statutory definition of accident as "an unexpected or
unusual event or result, happening suddenly."" 3 Apparently, the
unusual exertion requirement is really aimed at the statutory re-
quirement of "arising out of employment.""'
Recently, the Supreme Court of Florida has made recovery of
108. Id. at 588.
109. See L. ALPERT, supra note 92, §§ 6-5, 7-2.
110. 141 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1962).
111. This rule does not apply where there is an initial showing of the classic type of
accident such as a slip and fall. See Reynolds v. Whitney Tank Lines, 279 So. 2d 293 (Fla.
1973); Scott v. Kerr, 156 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1963).
112. See cases cited note 111 supra.
113. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(18) (Supp. 1978).
114. See L. ALPERT, supra note 92, § 6-5.
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compensation for work-related heart attacks even more difficult. In
Armour & Co. v. Tintera, " the trial judge found that an employee
had suffered a compensable heart attack which, according to his
attending physician, was precipitated by severe, work-related emo-
tional stress. This included long work hours and some difficulty with
his manager in the preceding few weeks. The supreme court held
that the claimant had failed to meet the unusual exertion test and
was, therefore, not entitled to recovery."' The court in Tintera ex-
plained its rationale for denial and cited the companion case of
Richard E. Mosca & Co. v. Mosca. "I In Mosca, the supreme court
stated: "Emotional strain is too elusive a factor to be utilized, inde-
pendent of any physical activity in determining whether there is a
causal connection between a heart attack or other internal failure
of the cardiovascular system and the claimant's employment."'1"
Claimant Mosca suffered a ruptured aneurysm. The court expanded
the use of its unusual exertion test for "heart" cases to cover the
cardiovascular system in general. The court thereby receded from
its earlier decision in Tracy v. Americana Hotel"' which considered
the same issue but held that the court's unusual exertion test was
limited to heart attacks and did not apply to other types of injuries.
Further understanding of the present state of the court's
"rule" 10 is gleaned from the decision in Richards Department Store
v. Donin2' decided shortly after the Mosca and Tintera decisions.
Claimant Donin, after working for approximately five months, had
both his work load and work-related stress increase as a result of
poor sales. The trial judge held, and the commission affirmed, that
the combination of these elements over the course of seven weeks
115. 362 So. 2d 1344 (Fla. 1978).
116. Id. at 1346. In support of his finding that the employee had suffered a compensable
cardiovascular injury, the Judge of Industrial Claims cited Barlow v. Harbour Island Spa, 4
F.C.R. 253 (1960), cert. denied, 139 So. 2d 879, rehearing granted in part, 139 So. 2d 879
(1962) (compensability affirmed on rehearing and remanded for apportionment). In Barlow,
claimant had engaged in heated arguments with the general manager for several months prior
to his heart attack as well as on the day of the attack. On that day, he had become extremely
upset, and within one-half hour after the last argument, the claimant felt pains in his chest
and was hospitalized with a heart attack. Although Victor Wine & Liquor, Inc. v. Beasley,
141 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1971), was decided two days before the Barlow case, the supreme court
in Tintera, as well as the Commission, seem to agree that Victor Wine had "overruled" the
Barlow decision.
117. 362 So. 2d 1340 (Fla. 1978).
118. Id. at 1342.
119. 234 So. 2d 641 (Fla. 1970).
120. It is euphemistic to call the court's unusal exertion requirement a rule. The court
has applied the requirement in a totally arbitrary manner as can be seen from the results in
the Barlow, Tintera, Tracy and Mosca cases.
121. 365 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1978).
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had resulted in a heart attack and compensation was allowed. The
Supreme Court of Florida reversed, stating that the claimant's
"theory of compensability is founded upon the fact that his
myocardial infarction was precipitated by a series of unusual, non-
routine, work-related, emotionally traumatic events and circum-
stances compressed within a specific period of time, rather than a
single isolated event."' 22 The court, under its test, required a show-
ing of unusual strain or overexertion which was not routine to the
type of work the employee was accustomed to performing.'2 3 It is
apparent from the above decisions that by court rule, cardiovascular
injuries must meet greatly increased requirements for compensabil-
ity. The questions as to what ultimately falls within the court's view
of the cardiovascular system and thereby precipitates establishment
of additional court-created criteria for compensability, and as to
what would then satisfy the criteria remain to be answered in future
decisions.
F. Average Weekly Wage
Many recent decisions deal with a myriad of frequently occur-
ring problems in this area. By statute, the average weekly wage is
determined by calculating average wages in covered employment
during the thirteen weeks immediately preceding the accident. 4
Pension contributions by the employer are included as wages under
this section.1'1 Also included in wages are bonuses paid after the
accident but attributable to the three months preceding its occur-
rence, "' as well as tips. The primary issue in the latter area is
whether just the formally reported tips or the actual tips received
are included. Generally, only the former are included unless the
employer has no formal reporting method or the employer, recogniz-
ing greater receipt of tips, nevertheless encourages the employee to
report only partially the amount of tips.7 Wages of the preceding
thirteen weeks include wages with the same or another employer.
122. Id. at 3.
123. The very nature of stress is cumulative, whether the time over which it accrues be
seconds, minutes, hours, days or weeks. There is nothing within human experience which can
be described as instantaneous stress. At what point the court's test is met, in terms of the
physical measure of PSI's within a particular time period, remains to be seen.
124. FLA. STAT. § 440.14(1) (Supp. 1978).
125. City of St. Petersburg v. Johnson, I.R.C. Order 2-3483 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n
July 21, 1978).
126. Rand Mill Work & Supply Co. v. Rand, I.R.C. Order 2-3538 (Fla. Indus. Rel.
Comm'n Sept. 12, 1978).
127. Top of the Home Restaurant v. Mourino, I.R.C. Order 2-3490 (Fla. Indus. Rel.
Comm'n Sept. 12, 1978)(S).
[Vol. 33:1391
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Thus, a claimant who held a job full-time and was injured the first
day on his part-time job was entitled to compute his average weekly
wage based upon both his part-time wages plus his average weekly
wage on the full-time job. 28 If an employee has worked for a sub-
stantial part of thirteen weeks, but previously had a record of taking
long breaks from work, a question is presented as to whether the
claimant should be treated as a full-time worker or as a part-time
worker, under the separate provision governing part-time workers. 129
Zins v. Saxony Hotel3 ' involved a worker who had actually worked
thirteen weeks on a full-time basis before his accident; the em-
ployer/carrier contended that claimant worked seasonally and
sought to have him treated as a part-time worker. The court held
that an individual who had worked thirteen weeks before his acci-
dent is not a part-time worker.' 3 ' Perkins v. Heller Brothers Packing
Corp. 32 involved an individual who had worked only part-time dur-
ing the seven weeks before his injury, thus satisfying one of the
statutory requirements for classification as a part-time worker. The
court held, however, that Perkins did not fall within the part-time
worker subsection because there was no intent that he be a part-
time worker, a further requirement under the statute. In the case
of a minor, there is a somewhat vague provision allowing for an
enhanced determination as to average weekly wage if it is estab-
lished "that under normal conditions his wages should be expected
to increase during the period of disability.' 1 33 It is unclear whether
"disability" in this section was intended to be used. in the sense of
continuance of the physical disability, which may be for a lifetime,
128. Robert Brown Bldg. v. Slack, I.R.C. Order 2-3463 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n June
27, 1978).
129. FLA. STAT. § 440.14(6) (Supp. 1978).
130. I.R.C. Order 2-3133 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Apr. 12, 1977)(S).
131. The applicable statutory provision states:
If it be established that the injured employee was a part-time worker at the time
of the injury, that he had adopted part-time employment as his customary prac-
tice, and that under normal working conditions he probably would have remained
a part-time worker during the period of disability, these factors shall be consid-
ered in arriving at his average weekly wages. For the purpose of this subsection
the term "part-time worker" means an individual who customarily works less
than the full-time hours or full-time workweek of a similar employee in the same
employment.
FLA. STAT. § 440.14(6) (1977). These requirements are in the conjunctive. Thus, although it
may have been true that claimant Zins only wanted to work seasonally, one requirement for
application of this subsection-that the injured employee was a part-time worker at the time
of the injury-was absent in this case.
132. I.R.C. Order 2-3542 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Sept. 20, 1978)(S).
133. FLA. STAT. § 440.14(5) (1977).
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or the maximum alllowable number of weeks for the particular disa-
bility.
The manner and method of establishing the expected increase
and the extent of rlecessary proof are also unclear. In American
Plastics & Packaging, Inc. v. McCann, 31 the commission found it
unnecessary to deal with the disability issue. It was also unneces-
sary to define a method of establishing "expected increase" because
the trial judge accepted uncontroverted proof that prior to the acci-
dent claimant had been offered a specific job in another field at a
wage entitling him to the maximum compensation rate in effect at
the time of his accident. 135 The trial judge determined that the of-
fered employment was at a rate entitling claimant to the maximum
compensation rate and his award of compensation benefits at that
rate was accordingly affirmed. The degree of proof necessary, absent
the unusual circumstances of a specific job offer prior to the acci-
dent, remains unclear.
G. Offsets to Payment of Compensation
Compensation payments by the employer may be offset by the
employer's payment of other benefits such as social security and
unemployment compensation. Wages paid by the employer in ex-
cess of the amount due for any given week are also deducted from
workmen's compensation benefits.
1. SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS
Effective July 1, 1973, the Florida Legislature shifted to Florida
employers and their insurance carriers the social security benefit
given to workmen's compensation claimants.'36 Previously, an indi-
vidual receiving workmen's compensation benefits could also re-
ceive social security benefits, but not in excess of eighty percent of
the claimant's preexisting wage as computed under applicable fed-
eral law. In establishing the Florida offset, the legislature provided
that the combined workmen's compensation and social security
benefits could not exceed eighty percent of the employee's weekly
wage, presumably as defined by Florida law, with any reduction of
benefits to maintain that percentage benefiting the Florida em-
134. I.R.C. Order 2-3390 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Apr. 15, 1978).
135. Since the claimant's eye injury was a scheduled disability, the question as to the
exact amount of the claimant's average weekly wage became moot once it was determined to
be such as to entitle him to the maximum compensation rate.
136. 1973 Fla. Laws ch. 73-127, § 5 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 440.15(10)(a) (Supp.
1978)).
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ployer/carrier. This change may result in a different dollar amount
for combined benefits than had been previously allowed since there
is a different method for determination of the base wage under social
security law and under Florida law. The statute provides no offset
in connection with benefits paid after the employee reaches the age
of sixty-two. 37 The questions to be asked are exactly which social
security benefits are offset and for how long, as well as by what
manner and method the employer/carrier may effectuate this offset.
Another significant issue is the payment of benefits to depen-
dents of an injured worker and the inclusion of these payments in
the offset. Oroweat Foods Co. v. Valle'35 interpreted the statutory
language: "such total benefits otherwise payable for such period to
the employee.' 31 The majority, in denying offset, presumably relied
on a strict contruction of the language "payable . .. to the em-
ployee." The dissent placed greater emphasis on the language "such
total benefits" and reasoned that the legislative intent was that
there be an offset for payment of benefits to dependents.
An additional question arises as to whether the yearly five per-
cent supplemental increase to permanent total disability employ-
ees' 10 should be included in the offset determination. This provision
was adopted in part to rectify the problem which substantial infla-
tion creates for permanent total disability employees locked into an
unrealistically low compensation rate at the time of their injury.
This section accordingly provides an increase to permanent total
disability employees from a separate fund amounting to five percent
per year as applied to their compensation rate. The purpose of this
section is defeated for those individuals receiving social security
benefits if the supplemental benefits are considered subject to an
offset. Thomas v. City of Vero Beach' held these supplemental
compensation payments are subject to the offset provisions. In addi-
tion to this decision, the statute was amended, effective July 1,
1977, to specifically include these benefits under the offset provi-
sions."
There is also the question as to the manner and method by
which the employer/carrier takes the social security offset. The in-
jured employee is required, upon demand of the employer/carrier,
137. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(10)(a) (Supp. 1978); see McClaim v. S.S. Kresge Co., I.R.C.
Order 2-3518 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Sept. 1, 1978)(S).
138. I.R.C. Order 2-3512 (Fla. Indus. Rel Comm'n Sept. 25, 1978).
139. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(10)(a) (1977).
140. Id. § 440.15(1)(e).
141. 365 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 1978).
142. 1977 Fla. Laws ch. 78-290, § 4 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.15(10)(c) (Supp. 1978)).
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to authorize the Social Security Administration to release disability
payment information. Willful refusal subjects claimant to the pen-
alty of termination of payment of workmen's compensation benefits.
Judicial decisions have permitted the employer/carrier to proceed
administratively to take this offset, 4 3 with the claimant having the
right to later challenge the amount of payment being made.'44 These
determinations are in accordance with the self-executing intent of
the workmen's compensation law, leaving the employer/carrier to
determine the benefits due or not due, and giving a claimant the
right to file, claim and seek a hearing when a dispute arises. If the
employer/carrier is proven wrong and seeks or takes a greater credit
than that allowed, a claimant employing an attorney may recover
attorney's fees."46
2. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BENEFITS
Effective July 1, 1977, an offset was allowed against payment
of temporary total disability benefits for an injured employee receiv-
ing unemployment compensation.'47 Effective July 1, 1978, this off-
set included an offset for a claimant receiving permanent total disa-
bility benefits."4 Prior to these statutory enactments it had been
held that an individual could receive both temporary total disability
and unemployment compensation benefits."'
3. CREDITS FOR OVERPAYMENT
A somewhat related area does not technically involve an offset
but rather a credit where payment of wages or compensation has
been in excess of that ultimately found due on a weekly basis. The
leading decision in this area is Schel v. City of Miami."50 The City
of Miami'continued to pay claimant's customary wage and sought
143. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(10)(c) (Supp. 1978).
144. Town Drug Inc. v. Maples, I.R.C. Order 2-3389 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Apr. 5,
1978)(S), involved an offset claim in which the Commission held that there was insufficient
evidence to determine the offset. The decision noted, hoWever, the right of the carrier to such
an offset at a later time. See also Winter Garden Citrus Prods. v. Huffstutler, I.R.C. Order
2-3563 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Oct. 6, 1978)(S), where the Commission noted that the
carrier can administratively take a social security offset.
145. See note 144 supra.
146. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
147. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(11) (1977).
148. Id. § 440.15(11) (Supp. 1978).
149. See Edwards v. Metro Tile Co., 133 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1961); Atherton Oil Co. v.
Bailey, I.R.C. Order 2-2986 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n June 25, 1976); Diaz v. International
Book Corp., I.R.C. Order 2-2060 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n July 13, 1972).
150. 193 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 1966).
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a credit against further payments for payment of benefits in excess
of the weekly compensation rate due. The procedure violated the
compensation scheme which provided for Weekly payments at a
particular rate, with excess payments amounting to an advance
requiring the approval of a judge. The court held that no credit was
due.151
A deliberate attempt to circumvent the intent of the workmen's
compensation law and its method of payment, as in Schel, should
not give rise to a credit. The situation, however, Where payment of
compensation within the amounts of allowable weekly compensa-
tion, but in excess of the particular rate ultimately found due the
injured employee, presents more difficult problems. Holiday Inn v.
Stratford"'2 seems to indicate that a credit may be due, if at all, for
an overpayment against a similar classification of benefits ulti-
mately found due. Thus, excess payment of compensation for tem-
porary benefits above the employee's particular compensation rate
may only be utilized as a credit against additional temporary bene-
fits found due and may not be utilized as a credit or offset against
further permanent benefits.
Diplomat Hotel v. Diplomat Hotel53 involved payment of tem-
porary benefits in excess of the rate required for a considerable
period of time. At the hearing, several years after the accident and
after payments were made, the carrier contended for the first time
that payments were due at a lesser rate and sought a credit for
further payments due. The commission cited Schel in affirming de-
nial of the credit and held a credit not due except to the extent that
payments "in the amount of and within the time for disability com-
pensation of that class ultimately found to be due."' 54 The award of
additional temporary partial benefits involved a different period of
time than the one for which benefits were previously paid and there
was no award for permanent benefits.
It is suggested that the statutory provision' covering reim-
bursement from unpaid installments of compensation where there
had been an advance payment of compensation should be inter-
preted to mean only authorized advances. Rather than holding the
151. The issue centered around FLA. STAT. §§ 440.20(11)(a), (12) & (13) dealing with
advances, advanced payment of compensation and excess payments, which the statute deems
gratuities. These areas, presently covered by statutory provisions, were previously handled
by judicial rule.
152. I.R.C. Order 2-3199 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n July 18, 1977).
153. I.R.C. Order 2-3494 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Sept. 2, 1978).
154. Id. at 7 (citing Schel v. City of Miami, 193 So. 2d 170, 172 (Fla. 1966)).
155. FLA. STAT. § 440.20(12) (Supp. 1978).
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employer/carrier to instantaneous exactness, it is suggested that
they be given a reasonable time to determine the exact compensa-
tion rate and make corrections. The decisions, however, are in ac-
cord that where excess payments are made over a prolonged period
of time, it is violative of the workmen's compensation scheme to
then allow a credit against further benefits.
H. Procedure
Several recent procedural decisions are of interest. In O.H. De-
velopment Corp. v. Tejera,111 serial hearings were held over a long
period of time. It was held that the Judge of Industrial Claims had
erred in adjudicating the cause based upon evidence developed after
the first hearing. A claim was made for permanent total disability
and the evidence, as found by the judge, reflected that the claimant
had not reached that point until a few months after the first hearing.
When the Judge of Industrial Claims finally determined the cause,
it awarded permanent total benefits effective at a point in time
beyond the commencement of the first hearing. The decision ap-
peared to resolve the perplexing problem in serial hearings of new
evidence gathered by one of the parties after the issues had been
framed at the first hearing.
More recently, the decision in Ivey v. Universal Lathing Co. '"
purported to apply the Tejera principle by refusing to consider a
portion of a physician's opinion based on a post-hearing examina-
tion. The commission reversed, stating: "The entire purpose of
these proceedings in workmen's compensation is a search for
truth-truth of a dynamic and vital sort, not those stale slices of
yesterday's news."1" Another recent decision, Bridge Lumber Co. v.
Altman,' involved a post-trial hearing described by the commis-
sion as a "continuance" for the sole purpose of allowing the em-
ployer/carrier to present medical witnesses and a vocational expert.
The employer/carrier sought to expand the scope of the subsequent
hearing by presenting surveillance films taken subsequent to the
original hearing as rebuttal evidence. The Judge of Industrial
Claims refused to allow the presentation of that evidence. The trial
judge had refused on the grounds that the case was continued only
for presentation of the two expert witnesses. Affirmance on that
156. I.R.C. Order 2-2990 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Nov. 14, 1973), cert. denied, 342 So.
2d 1104 (Fla. 1976).
157. I.R.C. Order 2-3405 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Apr. 21, 1978).
158. Id.
159. I.R.C. Order 2-3408 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n Apr. 21, 1978).
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ground alone would have left the law with two directly contrary lines
of precedent. Instead of clarifying the law, the commission's opin-
ion created further inconsistency by carefully stating that its hold-
ing should not be construed to preclude altogether the admission of
evidence obtained after commencement of a hearing and specifi-
cally stated that it was within the discretion of the judge. The
synthesis of these decisions is that (1) it is error to decide a case on
evidence obtained after commencement of the first hearing
(Tejera); (2) it is error not to considerevidence obtained after the
first hearing (Ivey); and (3) the trial judge can or cannot accept
evidence obtained after the first hearing in the permissible exercise
of his discretion (Altman).
Another area of confusion concerns the procedures connected
with approval of settlement and interested parties in connection-
therewith. Lucerne General Hospital v. Thomas6 " involved settle-
ment proceedings between claimant and the carrier over a substan-
tial outstanding hospital bill. The hospital learned of the settlement
proceedings and sought to intervene. Admittedly, there was an ap-
pealing fact situation for hospital intervention due to the size of the
hospital bill and the lack of any provision in the compensation
settlement for direct payment. The hospital would have been rele-
gated to collection from the claimant had they not been permitted
to intervene. The commission held that the hospital had definitely
become an interested party, pursuant to section 440.20(10) of the
Florida Statutes, and that it was error to exclude them as such. "'
It is unclear whether every known interested party need be given
notice of the washout or whether the opinion is limited to their
ability to intervene upon receiving knowledge. If the decision as to
the right of intervention is correct, it would seem to follow that
notice must be furnished to a broadly defined class of parties. If that
is, in fact, the state of the law, then the area of settlement in dis-
puted liability cases may become so cumbersome as to compel judi-
cial decision.
IV. CONCLUSION
Some legislative changes of significance, aimed at effectuating
a reduction in payment of benefits, were enacted-in the 1978 legisla-
tive session. Of greater significance was the policy decision to re-
quire an injured workman to pay a portion of his attorney's fees even
though such fees are due only where there has been a failure volun-
160. I.R.C. Order 2-3517 (Fla. Indus. Rel. Comm'n, Aug. 21, 1978)(S).
161. Id. at 5.
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tarily to provide benefits ultimately found to be due. In addition,
an entire revamping of the workmen's compensation scheme is a
possibility in the next legislative session. The judiciary has con-
tinued the trend pointed to in the previous survey; i.e., consider-
ably restricting the range of compensable consequences and closely
scrutinizing entitlement to and awarding of attorney's fees.
The recent developments in workmen's compensation law re-
flect, both legislatively and judicially, a narrowing of the range of
compensable injuries, a reduction of benefits and a restriction of the
ability of the injured workman to obtain effective counsel to repre-
sent him in obtaining benefits. The latter is probably the most
serious change, since the ability to obtain such counsel has, in the
past, been the only meaningful enforcement mechanism in work-
men's compensation law.
